Alex
01-03-2007, 17:16
Un articol scris de o ziarista irlandeza dupa doi ani de documentare, calatorii in Romania, invatat limba romana, etc. Cu alte cuvinte, o scurta istorie postdecembrista vazuta din exterior de un ochi care desi este critic in realitate este indragostit de Romania. (Pentru ca depaseste 2000 de caractere o sa il postez ca si inca doua reply-uri - sper sa aveti rabdare sa-l cititi)
“No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time from time”
Winston Churchill 1947
Abstract
This essay looks at the reasons why Romania lagged behind Central European countries in its democratisation efforts over the past 15 years. It identifies endemic corruption as a key reason. This corruption -a result of elitism/populism- saw Romania stagnate in “partial reform” until recently. The essay also finds historical legacies as an explanation for why Romania lagged behind. In short Romania started the democratisation process reluctantly. This was compounded by a lack of opposition and virtually no civil society. Corruption and historical legacies are threaded throughout the essay. Other indicators of democracy such as human rights and minority rights were not of concern to President Ion Iliescu but saw Romania continually criticised by the international community. The essay identifies EU conditionality and geo-politics as the main reason that Romania finally caught up and now approaches EU membership.
Introduction
The sweeping changes that took place across Eastern Europe in 1989, were in fact, part of the vast third wave of democratisation that had begun 15 years earlier in Southern Europe, namely Spain and Portugal (Huntington: 1996) Once deemed consolidated democracies, the aforementioned countries were also awarded EU membership along with Greece, whose democracy was arguably less consolidated.
By 1989 this wave reached a peak and around the world the events in Berlin, Prague and Bucharest were watched on television by millions creating a feeling of euphoria. Many believed that a global democratic revolution was under way, and that liberal democracy would soon exist everywhere (Huntington: 1996) or as Francis Fukuyama (1989) even stated that history was at an end and that we were approaching the end point of mans ideological evolution which had included communism, that the inevitable end was the universalisation of Western liberal democracy. In Romania the euphoria following the revolution in 1989 soon waned and a true consolidated democracy did not take root. Democratic consolidation as a label is en vogue but it suffers from being “abused, distorted and trivialised” (Sartoni: 1997)
Many in Romania would agree with Zhelev (1996) who stated that “revolutions…rarely meet the expectations they raise. Disenchantment and pessimism creep in. This is when we realise that the old regime, whose death knell we so eagerly sounded, is still very much alive. The euphoric sense that everything has changed is followed by a numbing suspicion that nothing has changed” (Zhelev: 1996: 5)
Democratisation in the post-communist countries has been the matter of debate among academics and policy makers studying the transition. Some state that as democracy has spread rapidly in the world, it has become a shallower phenomenon (Diamond: 2002) Romania since 1989 could many times have been labelled an illiberal or pseudo-democracy (Diamond: 2002) I will demonstrate that Romania lagged behind for years, as it did not meet all the terms of a consolidated democracy.
The Economy & Nomenklatura
There has never been a consolidated democracy that has a command economy. The basic tenets of democracy were formulated in the Paris Charter in 1990 and all European states accepted the principle of a free market economy (Agh: 1999) Most of the other countries in Eastern Europe had experienced some form of market reform prior to 1989, but in Romania this was not the case, and so it had no time to evolve from a command economy. Prior to 1989 Romania was one of the most tightly controlled and centralised economies in Eastern Europe. It clung to the Stalinist model long after Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia had abandoned it. Economic theory other than dogmatic Marxism was banned in universities, thus post 1989 there was very little understanding of the intrinsic complexity of a market economy.
Even with the world recession of the 80s and Romania’s accumulation of $10billion debt Ceausescu had refused to adjust his policies and instead he used an extraordinary “shock therapy” (Osiatynski: 1997) even introducing an obligatory six day working week for all workers and years of sever austerity followed. At this precise time the dictator’s growing megalomania saw him begin his project to build the now infamous “casa poporului” in Bucharest, the second largest building in the world after the Pentagon, as his own private home. Is it any wonder the same population was not prepared for more “shock therapy” in 1990? Historical legacy had its role to play in Romania’s poor economic reforms but the main obstacle was corruption.
If liberal economics is deemed necessary for a democracy then the lack of such is a threat to a nascent democracy. “The threats we now face are a quasi-hybrid economy wherein crime, racketeering, corruption, political manipulation and the mafia thrive. Communism is dead but we must be careful not to let its still-twitching corpse pull the infant democracy down the grave with it” (Zhalev:1996: 6).
Many of the same elite, who had operated in the communist regime, survived the same regimes’ collapse. The discredited leaders were of course removed quickly and publicly to give the impression of removing the old corrupt, and nowhere more spectacularly was this exemplified then in the execution of Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife Elene on live television on Christmas Day. The old nomenklatura survived mostly in the economic and administrative areas than in the political realms (Higley et al: 1996) Bureaucracy under the Communist regime in Romania was more inflated than in Central European countries and one of the features of such was the hierarchical system of personal dependence, which was reflected in post-communism as patronage and clientelism (Mihas, 1997)
The decisive political change in Romania came when the army shifted its allegiance to Ceausescu during the quasi- revolution and supported the National Salvation Front headed by Ion Iliescu who emerged just after the execution of Ceausescu. The presidential election in May which managed to exclude and fragment any real opposition saw Ion Iliescu appointed as President. He advocated the French style presidency with a two chamber parliament, in an effort to make himself the key figure in the transition. He soon placed his people in key institutions including the state media, the judiciary, and all the government departments. From the start the new regime clearly favoured those businessmen who demonstrated loyalty.
Post Communist Economic Reform
The analysis of economic reforms is based on the theory of what is known as the J-curve. Put simply, this theory states that reforms make things worse before they get better. This highlights the need for early “shock therapy” to kick start the process. It has been noted that in the transition process, the traditional short term losers have not been the obvious obstacle to these reforms, namely striking workers or discontented pensioners and the unemployed. The main obstacle to economic reform comes from the early winners, namely the corrupt elites, and Mafiosi. Their early winnings made them seek to stall full reforms as the benefits of partial reform lined their pockets (Hellman: 1998)
From the perspective of the winners, the J-curve is reversed (Hellman: 1998) After 1989 the communist party in Romania may have lost its role, but the personal networks built up over years remained and encouraged nomenklatura privatisation. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development considers privatisation the first step in the reform process, thus Romania was given the order to start privatisation and many saw opportunity too make quick money. Rose (1999) describes how the currency for nomenklatura privatisation changed from the party card to dollars or deutsche marks.
Romania is considered to have had two transition periods- a gradual transition phase between 1990-1997, followed by “shock therapy” after the change of government and the election of Emil Constantinescu in 1996 [though incredibly Iliescu was re-elected again in 2000] (Ibrahim&Galt: 2002)
The early reforms included the establishment of two tier banking with the Independent Romanian National Bank. The tax system was altered and a partial liberalisation of prices implemented. Property right laws were established and a reluctant privatisation process began. Often the process did not lead to the selling of assets; instead tokens were given to the population, many of whom tried to sell them on the black market, when theoretically they could not be traded. Though many private firms were established, those who were legitimate often failed and there were no bankruptcy laws. The legal system was complicated to set up a business and accessing credit was near impossible, with equally non attractive high interest rates (Ibrahim&Galt: 2002). By 1993 this mixed stabilisation-liberalisation policy was shattered (Osiatynski: 1997). Changes ground to a halt and the IMF refused loans to Romania. Relations with other international organisations were also strained and at this stage there was no mention yet of Romania joining the EU some day.
The 1997 introduction of “shock therapy” saw cuts in budget subsidies. Petrol increased by 53% immediately and energy fuel prices increased five fold. Railway tariffs increased by 80% and by the end of the year inflation was running at 100%. This was welcome news to the IMF, World Bank and the EU, all of whom gave credit to the cumulative amount of $1billion.
Of interest is the criticism by Gallagher (2005) of these institutions for imposing a hegemonic socio-economic model on Romania. He states that the IMF’s fiscal policies annihilated small and medium business. The country suffered a brain drain as a result. He states that internal and external factors reinforced each other to stall the process of democratisation.
The Effect of Economic Reforms on the people
Though the dissatisfaction of the population with economic reforms is often cited as a threat to democracy, Rose contests (in Linz&stepan, 1996) that humans are quite capable of making separate and correct judgements about a basket of economic goods (which may be deteriorating) and a basket of political goods (which may be improving) In Eastern Europe, the deterioration of the economy did not translate into erosion of support for democracy. Rose (1999) argues that though people in post-communist countries may wish for an American standard of living, a Swedish welfare state and British democratic institutions overnight, life under communism has taught them a lesson in “keeping expectations low and being patient…that is suffering in silence” (Rose:1999:54).
The cost of the economic reform on the population cannot be underestimated because of their silence. Many households had to revert to peasant style subsistence for survival when wages plummeted [if they were paid at all, or were not in arrears] and inflation was so high that any augmentation of social welfare became worthless. This household informal economy was the dominant economy (44%) in Romania in 1998, ten years after the revolution (Wallace&Latcheva: 2006) Just as the informal economy was vibrant and essential in communist times, so was it a vital part of transition economies. Many households ended up existing outside the formal economy and this included illegal activities but more often a-legal (Wallace& Latcheva: 2006).
The household economy, most present in Romania, included a combination of bartering, stockpiling, borrowing from friends, and remittances from abroad. Many Romanians re-acquired land in the country which saw a revival of peasant economy, where they could live self-sufficiently. Though vital for survival in these transition years, this lack of participation in the formal economy stalled economic growth.
[br]Postet at: March 01, 2007, 06:14:44 PM________________________________________________ _Corruption
Those who did had employment had such low wages there was obvious temptation for corruption (whether real or petty). The public mind-set is important in any economic transition. The daily routine must change and people must understand the new rules of the game (Osiatynski: 1997) As Prezeworski says democracy is consolidated when it becomes the only game in town. Under communism nobody played the rules of the game and that attitude still prevails today.
In 2004 Romania was still ranked 87 out of 146 countries surveyed by Transparency International’s corruption perceptions index. Diamond (2002) says that corruption disposes the country to recurrent crisis and hampers any ability to attract capital investment, and slows economic growth. Foreign investors seek stability and that explains why almost half of all direct foreign investment went to Hungary in the early years. Only in 2004 did the European Commission declare Romania a functioning market economy and that same year saw direct foreign investment of $5.2 billion. This has come at the same time as a clamp down on corruption, with the ex-prime minister Adrian Nastase recently having to step down as speaker of the chamber on charges of bribery charges. His propensity for hunting and collecting art was well known, and recently media journalists photographed this collection estimated at €5million. The population listened in awe as he told his countrymen that his aunt (a pensioner) had left him €1 million on her death. Perhaps a stronger civil society would have not allowed such corruption to have become so endemic.
Civil Society
A strong and active civil society can generate political alternatives and monitor the actions of the government and state and push for reforms. This can assist transition and deepen and consolidate democracy (Linz & Stepan: 1996). In Romania there was neither civil society nor an opposition.
Samizdat, the name given to the clandestine copying and distribution of government-suppressed literature or other media, which blossomed in many of the other communist countries was non-existent in Romania. The Polish underground press saw their publication Solidarnosc, reach a print run of 30,000 copies daily. In 1988 Romania was the only Warsaw Pact country with no opposition journal.
In Romania, one needed a license to own a typewriter, with each one traceable back to the owner. Romania’s Securitate managed to instill an obedient fear among the Romanian population and were known for their depraved torture techniques. People did listen to Radio Free Europe and would run the water for a bath and turn up their television sets (during the meager two hours of broadcast per day) to secretly tune in to RFE, yet no grass roots voice of dissent appeared. Ceausescu atomised the people. Small association of people, with no intrinsic political character were organised by the party state. This atomised society lingered after 1989 and though many were opposed to the take over by Iliescu and angry about government corruption, public opinion in the 1990s was either too weak, to divided and fragmented or perhaps even to weary and indifferent to demand accountability and good governance (Mungiu-Pippidi: 2002) If civil society was non-existent post 1989, the international non-governmental organistions that arrived post 1989 made a crucial contribution in supporting democratic values and the emergence of civil society.
Is the historical legacy of Ceausescu the only explanation for the lack of civil society in Romania? Gallagher (2005) traces the roots of corruption back to pre-communism and the early 19th century with the emergence of a patrimonial state and a clientelistic, political elite who would not have supported active citizenship or civil society. Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea, a left-wing theorist published Neo-Serfdom in 1910 in which he argued that Romania was trapped in feudalism with only the minimum of capitalist vehicle to ensure continued exploitation of the peasants. Romania was an agrarian society and the elite in the cities liked to keep the status quo.
It should be noted too that slavery (afflicted mostly on Roma) was only officially abolished in 1856 as Romania broke from Ottoman rule. France and Britain tried to press liberal economics and democratic values on Romania and it flirted briefly with this. Pre WW1, Romania was in the top five countries worldwide for wheat exports and in the inter-war years Bucharest had the reputation of a Paris of the East. This period was to brief to take any real roots or leave a lasting impression. The population, who lived under serfdom in a patrimonial society, became the workers in factories under Ceausescu’s near sultanistic rule. Civil society never had a chance to evolve.
Historical legacies and their relation to civil society can also be noted in regional differences. Transylvania is an example of this, a region in Romania, where social capital and civil society exists. The legacy of former colonial rule is often stated as influencing collective memory (Badescu & Sum: 2005) In this context Transylvania was under Habsburg rule until 1918, while the rest of the country was under Ottoman rule until 1877. In Transylvania, there was high ethnic diversity and religious pluralism. This subject of the Ottoman/Habsburg divide, or Catholic/Orthodox divide has become politically loaded since the publication of Samuel Huntington’s essay entitled Clash of Civilisations but many have mentioned it as one of the explanations for the variances across the post-communist divide (Rupnik:1999) Post 1989, Transylvanians are more active members of associations than their compatriots. Their trust in NGOs correlates with their trust in local papers, the city hall and the European Union (Badescu & Sum: 2005). The city of Sibiu, in Transylvania is to be joint Capital of Culture in 2007 along with Luxemburg, a true feat for civic pride.
Opposition
At the root of public disillusionment is anger over corruption. Rose (1999) found that 70% of the population of post-communist countries believed that the new regime was more corrupt than its predecessor. Corrupt leaders will not initiate reform and will not accept it unless they are pressurised to do so (Diamond: 2002) often only when their re-election is in jeopardy by a strong opposition.
The parties in opposition in 1990 were the National Peasant Christian Party, the National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic party. They were all historical parties which had been suppressed in the 1940s and attempted resuscitation but with ageing leaders and no young blood in the waiting, they were ultimately unsuccessful (Carothers: 1997) The minority parties in Romania were single-issue parties and thus only promoted minority interests (Mihas, 1997) thus they too failed to create a real opposition.
By the 1980s Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia had well-articulated hard-line reformist camps within the party system (Higley et al: 1996) In Poland a vote of no confidence in the regime by the Solidarity movement saw the Party grant them legal status and meet many of their demands. When Alexander Kwasniewski was interviewed after becoming president of Poland, he stated that he was never a communist. He added that since the 1970s there were few communists and much more technocrats, reformers and liberals waiting in hiding for the collapse of communism (Higley et al:1996). This can explain why Hungarian, Polish and Czechs adapted behaviours characteristic of fellow Western leaders.
In contrast, in Romania the plotters of the revolution inside the party camp had no such similar plans and no strong opposition existed. Even in 1992 when the US International Republican Institute for election monitoring, assisted to empower the opposition groups, Iliescu won the elections again (Carothers: 1997) The Soros Foundation was also funding democratistion projects and civil society enhancement in Romania but it took until 1996 for the opposition to finally come to power. The pattern established under Iliescu was one of both policy and personnel control, with three successive weak prime-ministers whom he could steer. It has been noted that the Central European states have leaned towards parliamentarian democracy but that the Balkans have tended to prefer presidential; a return to the strong leader, the general secretary perhaps?
The importance of new key leaders and their immense role in building democracy, including a market economy cannot be underestimated. People such as Havel in the Czech Republic or Walesa in Poland paved the way for their countries consolidation of democracy. No such character emerged in Romania. Ion Iliescu, the president elected in 1990, was not of the same calibre. Quite simply he had no plans for democracy. That the people on the streets of Timisoara and Bucharest shouted for democracy in 1989 mattered not. Iliescu addressed the people as Comrades in his debut speech and told the population that Ceausescu had smeared the noble ideas of socialism and he spoke of a vague possible third way, thus actually rejecting democracy.
Schmitter (cited in Agh:2004) states that the mode of transition determines to an extent which type of democracy will emerge. Schmitter distinguishes four modes of transition. Of those four, “imposition” best describes the events in Romania, though popular belief holds that a revolution took place. Imposition leads to an elitist or populist democracy as we have seen under Iliescu.
The slow reforms generally have political leaders with the longest and most secure positions (Hellman: 1998) Governments who are insulated from electoral pressures and lobbyists maintain the aforementioned partial reform (Hellman:1998) Agh (2004) distinguishes between the Central European states whose process may be described as re-democratisation where the movement of opposition negotiated the transition, and the Balkans whose process of democratisation started where the “ruling elites acted first under the pressure of external changes [fall of Berlin wall] and tried to avoid the snowball effect of democratisation” (Agh: 2004: 269)
Ion Iliescu was to remain in power for six years and incredibly after a break 1996-2000 he was re-elected again in 2000, losing once more in 2004. I would argue that one can almost trace the consolidation of democracy in Romania in close relation to Ion Iliescu from his manipulated taking of power through to his strong hold on power for his own gain. The presidential elections in 2004 almost saw the former Prime Minister Adrian Nastase, an Iliescu crony, elected but second round votes saw Traian Basescu of the Justice and Truth Alliance win by a margin (51%) This is seen as a turning point in Romanian politics.
[br]Postet at: March 01, 2007, 06:15:39 PM________________________________________________ _Respect for Human Rights and Rule of Law
Definitions of democracy go further than simple political competition, fair elections and participation. Robert Dahl’s definition states the need for a substantial level of freedom, such as a freedom of press and of speech and a pluralism that allows people to express their beliefs meaningfully. Comparative surveys by Freedom House on political and civil liberties across the globe show that there is a significant gap between electoral democracy and liberal consolidated democracy. The Freedom House ratings are the main indicator of democracies. In 2006, Romania scored 2 for political rights and 2 for civil rights. All 10 new accession countries scored 1 on both these indicators.
The state news-agency Rompress and the National Broadcaster TVR have always shown allegiance to Iliescu. In 2001 the replacement of the executive director and head of news who had headed TVR during the brief change in government, received criticism from the European Commission. Prior to the 2004 change in libel laws, “defamation of the country” was a crime punishable by imprisonment. This law restricted serious critical journalism. There is no clear code of ethics for journalists yet today, although a professional solidarity is indeed growing. A freedom of information act was passed in 2001 but still today old Securitate files are difficult to access. The Council for the Study of Securitate Archives set up in 2001 only allows limited access to the dissatisfaction of journalists, citizens, and some politicians (Stan: 2004) Unlike Czech or German lustration laws which banned communist style police (Securitate/Stasi) and informers from participating in post-communist politics, Romanian law allows such representation (Stan: 2004) In 2002 an anonymous memo was sent to the mass media entitled Armaghedon 7 in a name and shame exercise, identifying 250 former Securitate officers turned successful politicians and businessmen (Stan: 2004).
In 1992, new democracies barometer surveys in post communist states found that an average of 40% were concerned that ethnic minorities could be a threat to order but by 1998 that proportion had fallen to 25%. However, the ethnic card or race card was played by governments at times and as Diamond (2002) states when there is economic stagnation it can reinforce the resentment of discrimination felt by the minorities such as the Roma. Romania has the largest Roma population in the region. The demise of communism reawakened the desire amongst minorities to gain their rights, which was often at odds with the majority who after communism had a revitalised national interest (Mihas, 1997). After communism and its affinity with Atheism, minority religions also surface and people were eager to practice freely.
Apart from fulfilling the Copenhagen membership criteria and incorporating the aquis communautaire into legislation, the EU pressured Romania to address issues such as minority rights, children’s rights, disability rights, gay and lesbian rights, environmental rights and more. European conditionality therefore transformed the domestic policies in Romania for what was in fact a foreign policy aspiration, namely full membership of the EU.
In 2002 Romania nullified its law that criminalised homosexuality, and in the same year introduced legislation to ban gender discrimination and sexual harassment. There are now 18 recognised minorities in Romania, the largest being Hungarian. Rights entitled to recognised minorities include the rights to use their native language in court and in state institutions, where 20% of the population is minority. Though millions has been spent in PHARE funded projects for the Roma, they are still disproportionately represented in prisons and orphanages. Recognition of minority rights seems to have done little to alleviate Roma marginalisation in society.
The Greater Romanian Party, a nationalist, right wing, xenophobic political party seemed in the late 1990s to be gaining support, at the same time as the National Front in France and the Freedom Party in Austria (similar xenophobic parties) Romania’s treaty with Hungary in 1996 and the inclusion of two representatives in the 1996 government coalition may have taken the wind out of the Greater Romanian Party’s sails and thankfully the party seems to have been isolated since then.
Diamond (2002) states that the more endemic the problem of corruption is, the more likely that it will be accompanied by other deficiencies in the rule of law such as smuggling, trafficking, racketeering and human rights abuses. In Romania a case in point would be the selling of babies. If the images of Timisoara and Bucharest in 1989 briefly made Romania appear like a champion of freedom in the world, the images that followed in 1990 of the heavy army clamp down on miners marching on Bucharest and the disturbing images of malnourished children, feral-like in state institutions created a very different image. Romania and human rights or children’s rights were not synonymous. Just like the partial reform in the economy the partial reform of child protection was profitable to some.
Despite a worldwide response to the plight of Romania’s orphans and the hard work of numerous NGOs in the field the problem seemed persistent. Most of the orphans were not actually orphans as they did in fact have parents but had been given up to the state as part of Ceasusecu’s Orwellian plan to build the next generation of apparatchiks. They were the result of social engineering. Children were still being abandoned in institutions in the 1990s. Many children were being sold. Then in 2001 the EU pressured Romania to ban international adoption. Interestingly, this issue has seen huge divide internationally with the US lobbying most for an end to the ban as the US has the highest demand for babies for adoption. When Baroness Emma Nicholson, rapporteur for Romania started to harshly criticise Romania’s treatment of the 60,000 children in institutions, the government acted with indignation but it soon swept through huge child protection laws and decentralised the newly named National Authority for the Protection of Children and Adoption.
Trafficking of women was another issue ignored by government policy for most of the 1990s. Once again I would highlight endemic corruption as the reason for the trafficking in human beings is a highly profitable industry along with drug trafficking and arms smuggling. Romania introduced legislation on trafficking in 2001. It would seem therefore that on human rights and the rule of law as democratic principles, Romania lagged behind once again as a result of endemic corruption.
The laggard catches up
Romania had a short record of engagement with the West during the Cold War in the the 60s and 70s, in which time US president Nixon visited Bucharest and praised Ceausescu for distancing Romania from the Warsaw pact-Romania ceased to participate actively in the military command of the Warsaw Pact after 1969, though fell short of actually withdrawing from the pact. Romania however became increasingly isolated again in the 80s.
Initially the West lacked any clear strategy for assisting democratic consolidation in the post-communist countries. The OECD counties launched an aid programme and the EC set up their similar PHARE funding programme-which was given to Hungary and Poland but such aid came with conditions, which Romania did not meet. Therefore no aid reached Romania until 1991. During those same years, trade and cooperation agreements between the EC and Romania were also held up because of concern for minority rights. Conditions had to be met for any association agreements with the EC; rule of law, human rights, multi-party systems, fair elections and a market economy. The first agreement was signed with Romania in 1991, more as a result of the attempted coup in the Soviet Union, then for Romania meeting the conditions. The West wished to extend their influence in the area. In 1993 Romania became a member of the Council of Europe. The CoE sees that membership is positive for countries as it familiarises them with democracy and democratic practices. It places emphasis on human rights and minority rights as criteria for democracy and has the monitoring mechanisms to monitor such (Agh: 2004)
The early years saw the EU exert passive leverage on Romania. There was no talk of EU expansion and certainly not to include the Balkans. The war in the former Yugoslavia changed this attitude quickly. Since 1995 the EU has exerted active leverage, setting explicit targets for countries to qualify for membership (Spendzharova:2003). The EU has strong conditionality leverage through the financial assistance it can give or refuse, the “carrot” and “stick” (Bojkov:2004)
NATO’s air campaign against Serbia saw Romania strategically positioned. Romania also demonstrated allegiance to the West by refusing Russia permission to fly over its airspace to reinforce troops who had arrived already in Pristina. At the Helsinki summit in 1999 Romania and Bulgaria were invited to join negotiations for full membership of the EU-seen by many as a reward for their assistance in the Kosovo crisis. Geo-Politics certainly had a role in Romania’s initial aspirations.
There was support when Romania announced its candidacy for NATO in 1996. Requirement for NATO membership was largely technical i.e modernising the army, and though NATO claims democracy to be a pre-requisite for membership, in reality that criteria is not as stringent as the EU conditions. Iliescu could impress the US without having to make any serious reforms. Romania’s bid for NATO seemed on hold when George W Bush came to power and indicated at less involvement in Europe and no new NATO expansion (Gallagher: 2004). That all changed with 9/11. Romania was once again strategically placed bordering the Black Sea. NATO membership now required cooperation in the “War on Terror” and Romania was quick off the mark sending a unit named the red scorpions to Afghanistan. When the US moved to Iraq, Romania offered its territory to station troops.
Romania showed further zeal in 2002 when it became the first country in the world to sign a bilateral agreement with the US under which it would guarantee immunity to US personnel indicted to the newly formed International Criminal Court. Though this pleased the US immensely, the European Commission commented that they would have expected more from a future member state (Gallagher: 2004).
Romania’s strategic geographical location, “the land between” which for centuries resulted in occupation, has in recent years proven to be to its advantage in achieving NATO membership and now probable EU membership. Geo-politics alone has not seen Romania considered for membership. EU conditionality has forced reforms to finally take place in Romania.
Conclusion
The EU enlargement commissioner Olli Rehn recently stated that there had been huge changes in Romania as a result of rigorous EU conditionality and he commended Romania’s economic and democratic transformation. It would seem that Romania’s transition to democracy is complete. Most Romanians think it will be a political decision next month whether to let them join and not a question of their implementation of the 80,000 page aquis communautaire.
Reinhold Niebuhr’s words were accurate when he stated that “man’s capacity for justice makes democracy possible but man’s inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary” Romanians have seen Ceausescu’s injustice under communism, and I would argue, Iliescu and his elite’s injustice under partial reform. (ENDS 5,397 words)
“No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time from time”
Winston Churchill 1947
Abstract
This essay looks at the reasons why Romania lagged behind Central European countries in its democratisation efforts over the past 15 years. It identifies endemic corruption as a key reason. This corruption -a result of elitism/populism- saw Romania stagnate in “partial reform” until recently. The essay also finds historical legacies as an explanation for why Romania lagged behind. In short Romania started the democratisation process reluctantly. This was compounded by a lack of opposition and virtually no civil society. Corruption and historical legacies are threaded throughout the essay. Other indicators of democracy such as human rights and minority rights were not of concern to President Ion Iliescu but saw Romania continually criticised by the international community. The essay identifies EU conditionality and geo-politics as the main reason that Romania finally caught up and now approaches EU membership.
Introduction
The sweeping changes that took place across Eastern Europe in 1989, were in fact, part of the vast third wave of democratisation that had begun 15 years earlier in Southern Europe, namely Spain and Portugal (Huntington: 1996) Once deemed consolidated democracies, the aforementioned countries were also awarded EU membership along with Greece, whose democracy was arguably less consolidated.
By 1989 this wave reached a peak and around the world the events in Berlin, Prague and Bucharest were watched on television by millions creating a feeling of euphoria. Many believed that a global democratic revolution was under way, and that liberal democracy would soon exist everywhere (Huntington: 1996) or as Francis Fukuyama (1989) even stated that history was at an end and that we were approaching the end point of mans ideological evolution which had included communism, that the inevitable end was the universalisation of Western liberal democracy. In Romania the euphoria following the revolution in 1989 soon waned and a true consolidated democracy did not take root. Democratic consolidation as a label is en vogue but it suffers from being “abused, distorted and trivialised” (Sartoni: 1997)
Many in Romania would agree with Zhelev (1996) who stated that “revolutions…rarely meet the expectations they raise. Disenchantment and pessimism creep in. This is when we realise that the old regime, whose death knell we so eagerly sounded, is still very much alive. The euphoric sense that everything has changed is followed by a numbing suspicion that nothing has changed” (Zhelev: 1996: 5)
Democratisation in the post-communist countries has been the matter of debate among academics and policy makers studying the transition. Some state that as democracy has spread rapidly in the world, it has become a shallower phenomenon (Diamond: 2002) Romania since 1989 could many times have been labelled an illiberal or pseudo-democracy (Diamond: 2002) I will demonstrate that Romania lagged behind for years, as it did not meet all the terms of a consolidated democracy.
The Economy & Nomenklatura
There has never been a consolidated democracy that has a command economy. The basic tenets of democracy were formulated in the Paris Charter in 1990 and all European states accepted the principle of a free market economy (Agh: 1999) Most of the other countries in Eastern Europe had experienced some form of market reform prior to 1989, but in Romania this was not the case, and so it had no time to evolve from a command economy. Prior to 1989 Romania was one of the most tightly controlled and centralised economies in Eastern Europe. It clung to the Stalinist model long after Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia had abandoned it. Economic theory other than dogmatic Marxism was banned in universities, thus post 1989 there was very little understanding of the intrinsic complexity of a market economy.
Even with the world recession of the 80s and Romania’s accumulation of $10billion debt Ceausescu had refused to adjust his policies and instead he used an extraordinary “shock therapy” (Osiatynski: 1997) even introducing an obligatory six day working week for all workers and years of sever austerity followed. At this precise time the dictator’s growing megalomania saw him begin his project to build the now infamous “casa poporului” in Bucharest, the second largest building in the world after the Pentagon, as his own private home. Is it any wonder the same population was not prepared for more “shock therapy” in 1990? Historical legacy had its role to play in Romania’s poor economic reforms but the main obstacle was corruption.
If liberal economics is deemed necessary for a democracy then the lack of such is a threat to a nascent democracy. “The threats we now face are a quasi-hybrid economy wherein crime, racketeering, corruption, political manipulation and the mafia thrive. Communism is dead but we must be careful not to let its still-twitching corpse pull the infant democracy down the grave with it” (Zhalev:1996: 6).
Many of the same elite, who had operated in the communist regime, survived the same regimes’ collapse. The discredited leaders were of course removed quickly and publicly to give the impression of removing the old corrupt, and nowhere more spectacularly was this exemplified then in the execution of Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife Elene on live television on Christmas Day. The old nomenklatura survived mostly in the economic and administrative areas than in the political realms (Higley et al: 1996) Bureaucracy under the Communist regime in Romania was more inflated than in Central European countries and one of the features of such was the hierarchical system of personal dependence, which was reflected in post-communism as patronage and clientelism (Mihas, 1997)
The decisive political change in Romania came when the army shifted its allegiance to Ceausescu during the quasi- revolution and supported the National Salvation Front headed by Ion Iliescu who emerged just after the execution of Ceausescu. The presidential election in May which managed to exclude and fragment any real opposition saw Ion Iliescu appointed as President. He advocated the French style presidency with a two chamber parliament, in an effort to make himself the key figure in the transition. He soon placed his people in key institutions including the state media, the judiciary, and all the government departments. From the start the new regime clearly favoured those businessmen who demonstrated loyalty.
Post Communist Economic Reform
The analysis of economic reforms is based on the theory of what is known as the J-curve. Put simply, this theory states that reforms make things worse before they get better. This highlights the need for early “shock therapy” to kick start the process. It has been noted that in the transition process, the traditional short term losers have not been the obvious obstacle to these reforms, namely striking workers or discontented pensioners and the unemployed. The main obstacle to economic reform comes from the early winners, namely the corrupt elites, and Mafiosi. Their early winnings made them seek to stall full reforms as the benefits of partial reform lined their pockets (Hellman: 1998)
From the perspective of the winners, the J-curve is reversed (Hellman: 1998) After 1989 the communist party in Romania may have lost its role, but the personal networks built up over years remained and encouraged nomenklatura privatisation. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development considers privatisation the first step in the reform process, thus Romania was given the order to start privatisation and many saw opportunity too make quick money. Rose (1999) describes how the currency for nomenklatura privatisation changed from the party card to dollars or deutsche marks.
Romania is considered to have had two transition periods- a gradual transition phase between 1990-1997, followed by “shock therapy” after the change of government and the election of Emil Constantinescu in 1996 [though incredibly Iliescu was re-elected again in 2000] (Ibrahim&Galt: 2002)
The early reforms included the establishment of two tier banking with the Independent Romanian National Bank. The tax system was altered and a partial liberalisation of prices implemented. Property right laws were established and a reluctant privatisation process began. Often the process did not lead to the selling of assets; instead tokens were given to the population, many of whom tried to sell them on the black market, when theoretically they could not be traded. Though many private firms were established, those who were legitimate often failed and there were no bankruptcy laws. The legal system was complicated to set up a business and accessing credit was near impossible, with equally non attractive high interest rates (Ibrahim&Galt: 2002). By 1993 this mixed stabilisation-liberalisation policy was shattered (Osiatynski: 1997). Changes ground to a halt and the IMF refused loans to Romania. Relations with other international organisations were also strained and at this stage there was no mention yet of Romania joining the EU some day.
The 1997 introduction of “shock therapy” saw cuts in budget subsidies. Petrol increased by 53% immediately and energy fuel prices increased five fold. Railway tariffs increased by 80% and by the end of the year inflation was running at 100%. This was welcome news to the IMF, World Bank and the EU, all of whom gave credit to the cumulative amount of $1billion.
Of interest is the criticism by Gallagher (2005) of these institutions for imposing a hegemonic socio-economic model on Romania. He states that the IMF’s fiscal policies annihilated small and medium business. The country suffered a brain drain as a result. He states that internal and external factors reinforced each other to stall the process of democratisation.
The Effect of Economic Reforms on the people
Though the dissatisfaction of the population with economic reforms is often cited as a threat to democracy, Rose contests (in Linz&stepan, 1996) that humans are quite capable of making separate and correct judgements about a basket of economic goods (which may be deteriorating) and a basket of political goods (which may be improving) In Eastern Europe, the deterioration of the economy did not translate into erosion of support for democracy. Rose (1999) argues that though people in post-communist countries may wish for an American standard of living, a Swedish welfare state and British democratic institutions overnight, life under communism has taught them a lesson in “keeping expectations low and being patient…that is suffering in silence” (Rose:1999:54).
The cost of the economic reform on the population cannot be underestimated because of their silence. Many households had to revert to peasant style subsistence for survival when wages plummeted [if they were paid at all, or were not in arrears] and inflation was so high that any augmentation of social welfare became worthless. This household informal economy was the dominant economy (44%) in Romania in 1998, ten years after the revolution (Wallace&Latcheva: 2006) Just as the informal economy was vibrant and essential in communist times, so was it a vital part of transition economies. Many households ended up existing outside the formal economy and this included illegal activities but more often a-legal (Wallace& Latcheva: 2006).
The household economy, most present in Romania, included a combination of bartering, stockpiling, borrowing from friends, and remittances from abroad. Many Romanians re-acquired land in the country which saw a revival of peasant economy, where they could live self-sufficiently. Though vital for survival in these transition years, this lack of participation in the formal economy stalled economic growth.
[br]Postet at: March 01, 2007, 06:14:44 PM________________________________________________ _Corruption
Those who did had employment had such low wages there was obvious temptation for corruption (whether real or petty). The public mind-set is important in any economic transition. The daily routine must change and people must understand the new rules of the game (Osiatynski: 1997) As Prezeworski says democracy is consolidated when it becomes the only game in town. Under communism nobody played the rules of the game and that attitude still prevails today.
In 2004 Romania was still ranked 87 out of 146 countries surveyed by Transparency International’s corruption perceptions index. Diamond (2002) says that corruption disposes the country to recurrent crisis and hampers any ability to attract capital investment, and slows economic growth. Foreign investors seek stability and that explains why almost half of all direct foreign investment went to Hungary in the early years. Only in 2004 did the European Commission declare Romania a functioning market economy and that same year saw direct foreign investment of $5.2 billion. This has come at the same time as a clamp down on corruption, with the ex-prime minister Adrian Nastase recently having to step down as speaker of the chamber on charges of bribery charges. His propensity for hunting and collecting art was well known, and recently media journalists photographed this collection estimated at €5million. The population listened in awe as he told his countrymen that his aunt (a pensioner) had left him €1 million on her death. Perhaps a stronger civil society would have not allowed such corruption to have become so endemic.
Civil Society
A strong and active civil society can generate political alternatives and monitor the actions of the government and state and push for reforms. This can assist transition and deepen and consolidate democracy (Linz & Stepan: 1996). In Romania there was neither civil society nor an opposition.
Samizdat, the name given to the clandestine copying and distribution of government-suppressed literature or other media, which blossomed in many of the other communist countries was non-existent in Romania. The Polish underground press saw their publication Solidarnosc, reach a print run of 30,000 copies daily. In 1988 Romania was the only Warsaw Pact country with no opposition journal.
In Romania, one needed a license to own a typewriter, with each one traceable back to the owner. Romania’s Securitate managed to instill an obedient fear among the Romanian population and were known for their depraved torture techniques. People did listen to Radio Free Europe and would run the water for a bath and turn up their television sets (during the meager two hours of broadcast per day) to secretly tune in to RFE, yet no grass roots voice of dissent appeared. Ceausescu atomised the people. Small association of people, with no intrinsic political character were organised by the party state. This atomised society lingered after 1989 and though many were opposed to the take over by Iliescu and angry about government corruption, public opinion in the 1990s was either too weak, to divided and fragmented or perhaps even to weary and indifferent to demand accountability and good governance (Mungiu-Pippidi: 2002) If civil society was non-existent post 1989, the international non-governmental organistions that arrived post 1989 made a crucial contribution in supporting democratic values and the emergence of civil society.
Is the historical legacy of Ceausescu the only explanation for the lack of civil society in Romania? Gallagher (2005) traces the roots of corruption back to pre-communism and the early 19th century with the emergence of a patrimonial state and a clientelistic, political elite who would not have supported active citizenship or civil society. Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea, a left-wing theorist published Neo-Serfdom in 1910 in which he argued that Romania was trapped in feudalism with only the minimum of capitalist vehicle to ensure continued exploitation of the peasants. Romania was an agrarian society and the elite in the cities liked to keep the status quo.
It should be noted too that slavery (afflicted mostly on Roma) was only officially abolished in 1856 as Romania broke from Ottoman rule. France and Britain tried to press liberal economics and democratic values on Romania and it flirted briefly with this. Pre WW1, Romania was in the top five countries worldwide for wheat exports and in the inter-war years Bucharest had the reputation of a Paris of the East. This period was to brief to take any real roots or leave a lasting impression. The population, who lived under serfdom in a patrimonial society, became the workers in factories under Ceausescu’s near sultanistic rule. Civil society never had a chance to evolve.
Historical legacies and their relation to civil society can also be noted in regional differences. Transylvania is an example of this, a region in Romania, where social capital and civil society exists. The legacy of former colonial rule is often stated as influencing collective memory (Badescu & Sum: 2005) In this context Transylvania was under Habsburg rule until 1918, while the rest of the country was under Ottoman rule until 1877. In Transylvania, there was high ethnic diversity and religious pluralism. This subject of the Ottoman/Habsburg divide, or Catholic/Orthodox divide has become politically loaded since the publication of Samuel Huntington’s essay entitled Clash of Civilisations but many have mentioned it as one of the explanations for the variances across the post-communist divide (Rupnik:1999) Post 1989, Transylvanians are more active members of associations than their compatriots. Their trust in NGOs correlates with their trust in local papers, the city hall and the European Union (Badescu & Sum: 2005). The city of Sibiu, in Transylvania is to be joint Capital of Culture in 2007 along with Luxemburg, a true feat for civic pride.
Opposition
At the root of public disillusionment is anger over corruption. Rose (1999) found that 70% of the population of post-communist countries believed that the new regime was more corrupt than its predecessor. Corrupt leaders will not initiate reform and will not accept it unless they are pressurised to do so (Diamond: 2002) often only when their re-election is in jeopardy by a strong opposition.
The parties in opposition in 1990 were the National Peasant Christian Party, the National Liberal Party and the Social Democratic party. They were all historical parties which had been suppressed in the 1940s and attempted resuscitation but with ageing leaders and no young blood in the waiting, they were ultimately unsuccessful (Carothers: 1997) The minority parties in Romania were single-issue parties and thus only promoted minority interests (Mihas, 1997) thus they too failed to create a real opposition.
By the 1980s Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia had well-articulated hard-line reformist camps within the party system (Higley et al: 1996) In Poland a vote of no confidence in the regime by the Solidarity movement saw the Party grant them legal status and meet many of their demands. When Alexander Kwasniewski was interviewed after becoming president of Poland, he stated that he was never a communist. He added that since the 1970s there were few communists and much more technocrats, reformers and liberals waiting in hiding for the collapse of communism (Higley et al:1996). This can explain why Hungarian, Polish and Czechs adapted behaviours characteristic of fellow Western leaders.
In contrast, in Romania the plotters of the revolution inside the party camp had no such similar plans and no strong opposition existed. Even in 1992 when the US International Republican Institute for election monitoring, assisted to empower the opposition groups, Iliescu won the elections again (Carothers: 1997) The Soros Foundation was also funding democratistion projects and civil society enhancement in Romania but it took until 1996 for the opposition to finally come to power. The pattern established under Iliescu was one of both policy and personnel control, with three successive weak prime-ministers whom he could steer. It has been noted that the Central European states have leaned towards parliamentarian democracy but that the Balkans have tended to prefer presidential; a return to the strong leader, the general secretary perhaps?
The importance of new key leaders and their immense role in building democracy, including a market economy cannot be underestimated. People such as Havel in the Czech Republic or Walesa in Poland paved the way for their countries consolidation of democracy. No such character emerged in Romania. Ion Iliescu, the president elected in 1990, was not of the same calibre. Quite simply he had no plans for democracy. That the people on the streets of Timisoara and Bucharest shouted for democracy in 1989 mattered not. Iliescu addressed the people as Comrades in his debut speech and told the population that Ceausescu had smeared the noble ideas of socialism and he spoke of a vague possible third way, thus actually rejecting democracy.
Schmitter (cited in Agh:2004) states that the mode of transition determines to an extent which type of democracy will emerge. Schmitter distinguishes four modes of transition. Of those four, “imposition” best describes the events in Romania, though popular belief holds that a revolution took place. Imposition leads to an elitist or populist democracy as we have seen under Iliescu.
The slow reforms generally have political leaders with the longest and most secure positions (Hellman: 1998) Governments who are insulated from electoral pressures and lobbyists maintain the aforementioned partial reform (Hellman:1998) Agh (2004) distinguishes between the Central European states whose process may be described as re-democratisation where the movement of opposition negotiated the transition, and the Balkans whose process of democratisation started where the “ruling elites acted first under the pressure of external changes [fall of Berlin wall] and tried to avoid the snowball effect of democratisation” (Agh: 2004: 269)
Ion Iliescu was to remain in power for six years and incredibly after a break 1996-2000 he was re-elected again in 2000, losing once more in 2004. I would argue that one can almost trace the consolidation of democracy in Romania in close relation to Ion Iliescu from his manipulated taking of power through to his strong hold on power for his own gain. The presidential elections in 2004 almost saw the former Prime Minister Adrian Nastase, an Iliescu crony, elected but second round votes saw Traian Basescu of the Justice and Truth Alliance win by a margin (51%) This is seen as a turning point in Romanian politics.
[br]Postet at: March 01, 2007, 06:15:39 PM________________________________________________ _Respect for Human Rights and Rule of Law
Definitions of democracy go further than simple political competition, fair elections and participation. Robert Dahl’s definition states the need for a substantial level of freedom, such as a freedom of press and of speech and a pluralism that allows people to express their beliefs meaningfully. Comparative surveys by Freedom House on political and civil liberties across the globe show that there is a significant gap between electoral democracy and liberal consolidated democracy. The Freedom House ratings are the main indicator of democracies. In 2006, Romania scored 2 for political rights and 2 for civil rights. All 10 new accession countries scored 1 on both these indicators.
The state news-agency Rompress and the National Broadcaster TVR have always shown allegiance to Iliescu. In 2001 the replacement of the executive director and head of news who had headed TVR during the brief change in government, received criticism from the European Commission. Prior to the 2004 change in libel laws, “defamation of the country” was a crime punishable by imprisonment. This law restricted serious critical journalism. There is no clear code of ethics for journalists yet today, although a professional solidarity is indeed growing. A freedom of information act was passed in 2001 but still today old Securitate files are difficult to access. The Council for the Study of Securitate Archives set up in 2001 only allows limited access to the dissatisfaction of journalists, citizens, and some politicians (Stan: 2004) Unlike Czech or German lustration laws which banned communist style police (Securitate/Stasi) and informers from participating in post-communist politics, Romanian law allows such representation (Stan: 2004) In 2002 an anonymous memo was sent to the mass media entitled Armaghedon 7 in a name and shame exercise, identifying 250 former Securitate officers turned successful politicians and businessmen (Stan: 2004).
In 1992, new democracies barometer surveys in post communist states found that an average of 40% were concerned that ethnic minorities could be a threat to order but by 1998 that proportion had fallen to 25%. However, the ethnic card or race card was played by governments at times and as Diamond (2002) states when there is economic stagnation it can reinforce the resentment of discrimination felt by the minorities such as the Roma. Romania has the largest Roma population in the region. The demise of communism reawakened the desire amongst minorities to gain their rights, which was often at odds with the majority who after communism had a revitalised national interest (Mihas, 1997). After communism and its affinity with Atheism, minority religions also surface and people were eager to practice freely.
Apart from fulfilling the Copenhagen membership criteria and incorporating the aquis communautaire into legislation, the EU pressured Romania to address issues such as minority rights, children’s rights, disability rights, gay and lesbian rights, environmental rights and more. European conditionality therefore transformed the domestic policies in Romania for what was in fact a foreign policy aspiration, namely full membership of the EU.
In 2002 Romania nullified its law that criminalised homosexuality, and in the same year introduced legislation to ban gender discrimination and sexual harassment. There are now 18 recognised minorities in Romania, the largest being Hungarian. Rights entitled to recognised minorities include the rights to use their native language in court and in state institutions, where 20% of the population is minority. Though millions has been spent in PHARE funded projects for the Roma, they are still disproportionately represented in prisons and orphanages. Recognition of minority rights seems to have done little to alleviate Roma marginalisation in society.
The Greater Romanian Party, a nationalist, right wing, xenophobic political party seemed in the late 1990s to be gaining support, at the same time as the National Front in France and the Freedom Party in Austria (similar xenophobic parties) Romania’s treaty with Hungary in 1996 and the inclusion of two representatives in the 1996 government coalition may have taken the wind out of the Greater Romanian Party’s sails and thankfully the party seems to have been isolated since then.
Diamond (2002) states that the more endemic the problem of corruption is, the more likely that it will be accompanied by other deficiencies in the rule of law such as smuggling, trafficking, racketeering and human rights abuses. In Romania a case in point would be the selling of babies. If the images of Timisoara and Bucharest in 1989 briefly made Romania appear like a champion of freedom in the world, the images that followed in 1990 of the heavy army clamp down on miners marching on Bucharest and the disturbing images of malnourished children, feral-like in state institutions created a very different image. Romania and human rights or children’s rights were not synonymous. Just like the partial reform in the economy the partial reform of child protection was profitable to some.
Despite a worldwide response to the plight of Romania’s orphans and the hard work of numerous NGOs in the field the problem seemed persistent. Most of the orphans were not actually orphans as they did in fact have parents but had been given up to the state as part of Ceasusecu’s Orwellian plan to build the next generation of apparatchiks. They were the result of social engineering. Children were still being abandoned in institutions in the 1990s. Many children were being sold. Then in 2001 the EU pressured Romania to ban international adoption. Interestingly, this issue has seen huge divide internationally with the US lobbying most for an end to the ban as the US has the highest demand for babies for adoption. When Baroness Emma Nicholson, rapporteur for Romania started to harshly criticise Romania’s treatment of the 60,000 children in institutions, the government acted with indignation but it soon swept through huge child protection laws and decentralised the newly named National Authority for the Protection of Children and Adoption.
Trafficking of women was another issue ignored by government policy for most of the 1990s. Once again I would highlight endemic corruption as the reason for the trafficking in human beings is a highly profitable industry along with drug trafficking and arms smuggling. Romania introduced legislation on trafficking in 2001. It would seem therefore that on human rights and the rule of law as democratic principles, Romania lagged behind once again as a result of endemic corruption.
The laggard catches up
Romania had a short record of engagement with the West during the Cold War in the the 60s and 70s, in which time US president Nixon visited Bucharest and praised Ceausescu for distancing Romania from the Warsaw pact-Romania ceased to participate actively in the military command of the Warsaw Pact after 1969, though fell short of actually withdrawing from the pact. Romania however became increasingly isolated again in the 80s.
Initially the West lacked any clear strategy for assisting democratic consolidation in the post-communist countries. The OECD counties launched an aid programme and the EC set up their similar PHARE funding programme-which was given to Hungary and Poland but such aid came with conditions, which Romania did not meet. Therefore no aid reached Romania until 1991. During those same years, trade and cooperation agreements between the EC and Romania were also held up because of concern for minority rights. Conditions had to be met for any association agreements with the EC; rule of law, human rights, multi-party systems, fair elections and a market economy. The first agreement was signed with Romania in 1991, more as a result of the attempted coup in the Soviet Union, then for Romania meeting the conditions. The West wished to extend their influence in the area. In 1993 Romania became a member of the Council of Europe. The CoE sees that membership is positive for countries as it familiarises them with democracy and democratic practices. It places emphasis on human rights and minority rights as criteria for democracy and has the monitoring mechanisms to monitor such (Agh: 2004)
The early years saw the EU exert passive leverage on Romania. There was no talk of EU expansion and certainly not to include the Balkans. The war in the former Yugoslavia changed this attitude quickly. Since 1995 the EU has exerted active leverage, setting explicit targets for countries to qualify for membership (Spendzharova:2003). The EU has strong conditionality leverage through the financial assistance it can give or refuse, the “carrot” and “stick” (Bojkov:2004)
NATO’s air campaign against Serbia saw Romania strategically positioned. Romania also demonstrated allegiance to the West by refusing Russia permission to fly over its airspace to reinforce troops who had arrived already in Pristina. At the Helsinki summit in 1999 Romania and Bulgaria were invited to join negotiations for full membership of the EU-seen by many as a reward for their assistance in the Kosovo crisis. Geo-Politics certainly had a role in Romania’s initial aspirations.
There was support when Romania announced its candidacy for NATO in 1996. Requirement for NATO membership was largely technical i.e modernising the army, and though NATO claims democracy to be a pre-requisite for membership, in reality that criteria is not as stringent as the EU conditions. Iliescu could impress the US without having to make any serious reforms. Romania’s bid for NATO seemed on hold when George W Bush came to power and indicated at less involvement in Europe and no new NATO expansion (Gallagher: 2004). That all changed with 9/11. Romania was once again strategically placed bordering the Black Sea. NATO membership now required cooperation in the “War on Terror” and Romania was quick off the mark sending a unit named the red scorpions to Afghanistan. When the US moved to Iraq, Romania offered its territory to station troops.
Romania showed further zeal in 2002 when it became the first country in the world to sign a bilateral agreement with the US under which it would guarantee immunity to US personnel indicted to the newly formed International Criminal Court. Though this pleased the US immensely, the European Commission commented that they would have expected more from a future member state (Gallagher: 2004).
Romania’s strategic geographical location, “the land between” which for centuries resulted in occupation, has in recent years proven to be to its advantage in achieving NATO membership and now probable EU membership. Geo-politics alone has not seen Romania considered for membership. EU conditionality has forced reforms to finally take place in Romania.
Conclusion
The EU enlargement commissioner Olli Rehn recently stated that there had been huge changes in Romania as a result of rigorous EU conditionality and he commended Romania’s economic and democratic transformation. It would seem that Romania’s transition to democracy is complete. Most Romanians think it will be a political decision next month whether to let them join and not a question of their implementation of the 80,000 page aquis communautaire.
Reinhold Niebuhr’s words were accurate when he stated that “man’s capacity for justice makes democracy possible but man’s inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary” Romanians have seen Ceausescu’s injustice under communism, and I would argue, Iliescu and his elite’s injustice under partial reform. (ENDS 5,397 words)